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Johnson: Civil Disobedience and the Law
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
VOL. XX

WINTER 1968

NO. 3

CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND THE LAW*
FRANK M. JOHNSON, JR.**
It will be my purpose to introduce for consideration some historical and
jurisprudential factors that seem to bear on the validity and practice of the
doctrine of civil disobedience in this country. I will not in any way advocate
a doctrine or declare a position other than I have already done in court
decisions. I would suggest, however, that lawyers and judges must concern
themselves with the social changes this country is presently experiencing. It
is essential that we understand these changes-even if we do not actively
participate in any of the movements that have as their purpose social and
political changes through the practice of civil disobedience.
We lawyers have our function: We draft laws and interpret them; try
cases and render legal decisions; we advise clients about their rights and defend those rights with every clause of the Constitution and every legal tool
at our command. But social change is not ordinarily one of our skills. For
the most part we are not trained to reconstruct the relationships of a community or to change the minds and hearts of people. Nevertheless, most of
us understand that unless the minds and hearts of people are changed, laws
are powerless. "[in this and like communities," Lincoln said, "public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment, nothing can fail; without it
nothing can succeed. Consequently, he who moulds public sentiment goes
deeper than he who enacts statutes or pronounces decisions. He makes
statutes and decisions possible or impossible to be executed."'
Lincoln was not one to sell the legal profession short. The Constitution
must be enforced, he said, knowing that enforcement of the law is itself
a form of persuasion. The law is a teacher. People learn to drive on the
right side of the street by obeying the law requiring them to drive there.
Citizens of the Thirteen Original States came to consider themselves citizens
of the United States because the Constitution of the United States was ratified,
established, and enforced. Without the working of the Constitution, no
amount of talk would have convinced Americans to abandon their parochial
loyalties for a higher allegience.

*Address prepared for the annual University of Florida Law Review Banquet, January
27, 1968.
**Chief Judge, United States District Court, Middle District of Alabama.
1. First Lincoln-Douglas Debate, Ottawa, Ill., Aug. 21, 1858, in LiNcoLN TREAsuRy 255
(comp. by Hansberger 1950).
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Today, compliance with the Constitution is still the best instruction in
our constitutional duties. Decisions of federal and state courts, fulfilling the
Constitution's promise of due process and equal protection of the laws, are
great and necessary milestones. But these decisions do not mark the end of
the road; they only point the way. Despite an impressive unanimity of the
courts and the determination of the majority of federal and state chief
executives, recent constitutional decisions leave us at an impasse. We still
have a substantial and sometimes dominant part of the public opposed to
compliance with one or more applications of the constitutional guarantee of
equal rights. It will not be enough to get more court orders. The courts
and the police power of all the states, cities, and federal government cannot
by themselves overcome emotional and psychological obstacles to school and
faculty desegregation, nondiscriminatory housing, equal job opportunities,
and other governmental action or policy such as prosecution of the undeclared war in Viet Nam. The law cannot act as teacher where the conditions
necessary for the educational process do not exist. Where opposition is violent and widespread, the law may be ignored, or obeyed only in form, its
spirit submerged in a wave of irrationality.
The question then is what can lawyers and judges do to help the law?
What can we do to break up the concentration of emotions on such issues,
to take the initiative out of the hands of social and political demagogues, and
release the forces of moderation, of respect for the law? At the outset, we
must understand the techniques and philosophy of those challenging the law.
The Negro rights and anti-war movements probably constitute the most important new social-political forces in America since the Civil War. They evidence the turmoil in man's thinking today: anti-war, anti-injustice, equalitarian, and generally nonviolent. It is important to comprehend how their
philosophies and procedures -whether styled sit-ins, demonstrations, or rebellions - have been and are being oriented into our system of law.
My discussion of this subject will not permit a search for or consideration
of legal or moral justification for the rioting, burning, looting, and killing
that have occurred in the Watts section of Los Angeles, in Detroit, Chicago,
and Newark. These acts are nothing more than inflictions of gross wrongs
upon innocent citizens; the loss of life and property through such activities
can only be condemned. Such outbreaks are insurrections against government and cannot be justified under the guise of civil disobedience. Neither
does the subject "Civil Disobedience" include, except for comparative purposes, totally "obedient" nonviolent challenges to law or state policy such as
distribution of pamphlets on Viet Nam or segregation, programs of voter
registration, and parades and picketing under permits, where permits are
2
required.
During recent years, many public events have repeatedly dramatized the
ancient and always troublesome problems of "civil disobedience." A group
of students defies the State Department's ban on travel to Cuba; a teachers'
2. E.g., the Selma-Montgomery, Alabama, march delayed until application was made

to the court to outline the "reasonableness" feature of the planned demonstration. Williams
v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
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union strikes despite prohibition by state law; advocates of civil rights employ
mass demonstrations of disobedience of the law to advance their cause (for
example, marching without a permit where one is required); and the governors of southern states obstruct enforcement of federal laws and declare themselves within their rights in doing so. A student editor flagrantly violates his
school's policy by criticizing the Governor and State legislature; 3 a coed poses
nude for an off-campus humor magazine, disregarding her university's standards of "appropriate conduct"; 4 reputable California doctors continue, in
violation of California law, to perform abortions on women exposed to
German measles during pregnancy. 5
Regardless of the form civil disobedience takes, we should be aware that
it is a procedure for challenging law or policy, and that such nonviolent
challenge is deeply rooted in our legal traditions.6 Even our laws recognize
a modified form of civil disobedience. To illustrate: tax law requires one
to report fairly his income and to pay all taxes assessed thereon. But the
law in this instance gives him a procedural choice to determine whether the
government's command must be obeyed. A citizen may either refuse to pay
and go into the Tax Court's deficiency procedure, or he may pay and sue
for a refund in the federal district court. A similar procedure is recognized
in Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.7 Many demonstrators assert that
3. Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
4. Gainesville [Fla.] Sun, Feb. 9, 1967, §A, at 2, col. 5 (18-year-old sophomore, Pamela
Brewer, convicted by Faculty Discipline Committee for "indiscreet and inappropriate
conduct").
5. Alabama Journal, Jan. 22, 1967, at 3, col. 1.
6. On June 15, 1215, King John' of England sealed the Magna Charta, which is regarded as the basis of the English Constitution; the rights incorporated therein were forced
from constituted authority and provided against the abuse of power by the King. Charles
I was denounced as a tyrant who was a constant threat to freedom, and in 1628 he was
compelled by his subjects to give his assent to the Petition of Right-a declaration of
the liberties of the people. James H ascended the throne of England in 1685 and promptly
put down a Protestant rebellion, at the same time trying to return England to the Roman
Catholic Church. James was deserted by the people of England for William of Orange
in what is now called the "Glorious Revolution." The "Declaration of Rights" was extracted as a condition to William's ascending the throne. The American colonists were
following tradition when they opposed the British government in taking from the colonists
the rights of free Englishmen. Opposition manifested itself explicitly and solemnly in the
memorable Declaration of Rights of the First Continental Congress, which convened in
Philadelphia in October 1774. That declaration, containing the assertion of great fundamental principles of Anglo-American liberty, constituted the basis of those subsequent bills
of rights that appeared in all our state constitutional charters. The delegates to the First
Continental Congress demanded the repeal of the most offensive of the recent British laws.
One of these demands inspired William Pitt to support the colonists-even in their "disobedient" Tea Party.
At the Provincial Convention held in the Colony of Virginia in March 1775, Patrick
Henry introduced resolutions to organize the militia and place the colony in an attitude of
defense. The resolutions met opposition, and Patrick Henry made his "liberty or death"
speech in response. The Declaration of Independence, adopted on July 4, 1776, was predicated in whole upon the theory that man has not only a right but also a duty to throw
off what he considers to be abuses and usurpations of authority.
7. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000a-2: "No person shall punish or attempt
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since the Vietnamese War violates international law they cannot be forced into
service. In Keegan v. United States," a member of the German-American
Bund advocated refusal of military service as a means of protesting a congressional enactment that disqualified Bund members for certain jobs. Keegan
asserted that the law unjustly discriminated against American citizens and
therefore they were not bound by the Selective Service Act. In holding that
an acquittal should have been directed as requested, the Court stated:
One with innocent motives, who honestly believes a law is unconstitutional and, therefore, not obligatory, may well counsel that the
laws shall not be obeyed ....
The same principle was applied in Okamoto v. United States,9 when
Japanese-Americans who had been evacuated from west coast cities and
placed in internment camps decided they were not subject to Selective Service
while so confined. Today, some student protestors and draft demonstrators
insist that when Selective Service revokes their deferred status because they
protest foreign policy, they are entitled to disobey the law because the revocation is unconstitutionally discriminatory. Where does this leave the prosecution of Dr. Benjamin Spock and Yale Chaplain William Sloane Coffin when
the law specifically sanctions the right to counsel "that the laws shall not
be obeyed .... "?10
The problems raised by the theory of civil disobedience are as old as
civilization itself. Centuries ago Antigone was torn between two loyalties: her
religion commanded her to bury the body of her dead brother; the state
demanded that she follow the dictates of the law and leave her brother uncovered to be eaten by vultures and hounds. She chose to follow her conscience and was forced to pay with her life. Socrates was condemned to die
for exercising his "freedom of speech." He chose to remain in Athens and
accept the penalty. Thoreau refused to pay taxes, which he thought were
illegally and immorally imposed to assist in enforcing the Fugitive Slave Act.
We must classify Gandhi and other contemporaries, such as Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr., on the side of Thoreau and Antigone.
While one may approve some of the motives that led to these actions and
disapprove others, all, nevertheless, raise the same fundamental question: Does
the individual have the right - or perhaps the duty - to disobey a law that his
to punish any person for exercising or attempting to exercise any right" protected by the
act. The Supreme Court has said that "nonforcible attempts to gain admittance to or
remain in establishments covered by the act are immunized from prosecution." Hamm v.
City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 311 (1964).
8. 325 U.S. 478, 494 (1945).
9. 152 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1945).
10. E.g., Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948) (publicly advocating polygamy); Taylor v.
State of Mississippi, 819 U.S. 583 (1943) (condemning the war and draft and distributing
literature to this effect); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (playing anti-Catholic
records in streets where 90% of the people were Catholic); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242
(1937) (recruiting members for the Communist Party). Is there a "clear and present danger"
under Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), when no war has been declared? For
an extensive treatment of this phase of the problem see Freeman, The Right of Protest and
Civil Disobedience, 41 IND. L.J. 228 (1966).
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mind, his conscience, or his faith tells .him is unjust? What is a citizen to do
when he finds himself in the position of Thoreau, Antigone, or Yale's chaplain? If he obeys his conscience, his moral convictions, or his religious belief
he may violate the law. Yet if he obeys the law, he may violate his conscience
or his moral or religious convictions. What would you do if the Florida
Legislature passed a statute making it a criminal offense to publicly proclaim
a belief in God? When and under what circumstances should the individual
be indifferent to the commands of the state?
Some answer this question unequivocally "never," reasoning that there
can be no law to which obedience is optional; that there never can be a legal
right to disobey the law. They argue that whatever is illegal is therefore
immoral; and that the law creates its own duty, concluding that social disaster
would result if everyone disobeyed the law or determined for himself which
laws he would obey. This position was recently stated by the Honorable
Charles E. Whittaker, former Justice of the Supreme Court: 1
While I do not claim that all of our crime is due to any one cause,
it seems rather clear that a large part of the current rash and rapid
spread of lawlessness in our land has been, at least, fostered and inflamed by the preachments of self-appointed leaders of minority groups
to "obey the good laws, but to violate the bad ones" - which, of course,
simply advocates violation of the laws they do not like, or, in other
words, the taking of the law into their own hands.
The same point of view has been put another way: 12
The conduct of various leaders, both political and social, who are
busily engaging in the frustration of law and the spirit of the law for
their own personal avarice must be condemned by those intelligent
citizens who live by the law.
You citizens of reason and integrity cannot sit idly by while these
political leaders, aided and abetted by misguided and ignorant followers, make a mockery of law by prostituting legal process and stultifying the forms of law in defiance of their sworn duty to uphold the
Constitution and the laws of our land, while some of our powerful
leaders in the social field, reinforced by a multitude of blind followers,
engage in demonstrations that inevitably foment violence and preach
moral defiance of judicial decisions designed to protect the rights of
society. In both instances, the motivation is personal gain- economic,
social and political -without any regard to their government, their
laws, their courts or their people.
It is the duty and unique responsibility of every fair-minded citizen
to recognize and follow the proposition that respect for law is the most
fundamental of all social virtues, for the alternative to the rule of law
is violence and anarchy. This is true whether the individual agrees
or not. No system can endure where each citizen is free to choose which
law he will obey. Obedience to the laws we like and defiance of those
we dislike is the route to chaos.
11. Whittaker, Law and Order, 87 N.Y. STATE B.J. 897 "(1965).
12. Address by Frank M. Johnson, Jr. to Atlanta, Georgia, Bar Association, 1964. A
partial reprint of this speech was published as The Attorney and the Supremacy of Law,
1 GA. L. Rv.88, 41-42 (1966).
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In response to the same question, others reply as did Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr., testifying in the United States District Court in Montgomery in
March 1965. When asked "Well, what is your philosophy?" Dr. King responded:

13

I have said often and I have tried to write about it, that noncooperation with evil [ignoring evil] is as much an evil as cooperation
with evil, and I think there are times that laws can be unjust and
that a moral man has no alternative but to disobey that law, but he
must be willing to do it openly, cheerfully, lovingly, civilly, and not
uncivilly, and with a willingness to acept the penalty, with a hope
and a belief that by accepting this and doing it in this way he will be
able to arouse a conscience of the community over the injustice of
the law and therefore lead to the bright day that everybody will set
out to change it.
Stated differently:14
Thus civil disobedience is a new answer of how to divide our duties
to Caesar and God. As the claims of Caesar have grown louder, our
answer too often has been: We render unto Caesar that which Caesar
says is Caesar's and go to church on Sunday. With nonviolence we
can make real decisions - effective moral choices - in this apportionment between God and Caesar, between our conscience and the state.
Since the theory and practice of the civil disobedience we see is based
primarily upon the Gandhian technique, it is essential to explore briefly the
basic tenets of Gandhi's philosophy. His experiments with civil disobedience,
first undertaken in South Africa, were extended beyond the individual protest in India. During the struggle to lift the yoke of English rule, the Britishtrained lawyer developed a practice, which through application and refinement
became a technique for social and political changes. Nonviolence in Gandhi's
terms means the exercise of power or influence to effect change without
injury to the opponent. The technique is thus distinguishable from urban
riots and even from passive resistance intended to cause injury.
Gandhi's approach to civil disobedience combined two different views. The
first is that man has the right to act in accordance with his conscience in opposition to external authority. The second is that every citizen must qualify
himself by previous obedience of the laws before he has the right, which
should be exercised on rare occasions, to violate the law he feels is unjust.
Gandhi's technique is one that can be used by all who feel a conscientious
need to alleviate social problems or injustice. In justification, advocates of
Gandhi's method argue that it develops a social protest against unjust or
13. Record, vol. 1, at 75, 76, Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
14. Wofford, Non-Violence and the Law: the Law Needs Help, J. OF RELGious THOUGHT
(1957-1958). This article was written for the purpose of challenging others to follow the
practice of Rosa Park who in 1955 violated the bus segregation laws of the State of Alabama
and the City of Montgomery. See Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956),
afJ'd, 352 U.S. 903 (1956). See also Keeton, The Morality of Civil Disobedience, 43 TEXAS
L. Rav. 507 (1964).
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coercive sovereign action. The moral force linked with this practice is that
there is no violence or malice involved in the act. It is well known that
Gandhi used his methods with remarkable success.
To many, protest movements represent only crises in law enforcement.
They ask what is happening to the concept of law, and to the notion there
can be no disobedience of the law. The first to propound this question were
those opposed to any social or political change and accustomed to relying
on law itself to preserve ordered injustice instead of ordered liberty. 5 This
continual misuse of law shows an interest in promoting its tendency to
resist rather than its ability to foster peaceful social change. It must be
recognized, however, that the civil disobedience movement has indeed caused
many problems for law enforcement. It is particularly this aspect to which
lawyers need to give serious consideration. Among its most troubling characteristics is its dependence on fostering disrespect for law. Misguided talk
of civil disobedience is dangerous in that it arouses doubts in the minds of
those who could favor and support the law. Moreover, such loose discussion
lends itself to exploitation as an excuse for violence perpetrated by those
so inclined.
The problems of the protest movement become more complicated as its
aims become more diffuse. The relationship between the act of protest and
the condition of injustice protested is no longer dear. There has grown a
feeling that protestors as such should be immune from the law regardless of
the nature of their protest activities. Even though the laws may be legally
sound, the protestors sometimes feel they should be exempt from punishment
simply because they are demonstrating and protesting. On this point, I have
already observed:1 6
There is no immunity conferred by our Constitution and the laws
of the United States to those individuals who insist upon practicing
civil disobedience under the guise of demonstrating or protesting for
"civil rights." The philosophy that a person may-if his cause is
labeled "civil rights" or "states rights" -determine for himself what
laws and court decisions are morally right or wrong and either obey
or refuse to obey them according to his own determination, is a philosophy that is foreign to our "rule-of-law" theory of government.
Those who resort to civil disobedience such as the petitioners were
engaged in prior to and at the time they were arrested cannot and
should not escape arrest and prosecution....
15. This theory was advanced as justification for the authorities' failure to protect the
student "freedom riders" from assaults by Klansmen. The argument is predicated upon
the theory that the existing local law required segregation of the races even on the interstate buses, in the station waiting rooms, and the station restaurants; that the students
violating these local and state laws (as opposed to going to court to have them declared
invalid) did so as "outside agitators" and were entitled to very little, if any, public
protection. United States v. U. S. Klans, Knights of Ku Klux Klan, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 897
(M.D. Ala. 1961).
16. Forman v. City of Montgomery, 245 F. Supp. 17, 24 (M.D. Ala. 1965), aff'd, 355
F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1009 (1966). For a general discussion of
this aspect of the problem see Marshall, The Protest Movement and the Law, 51 VA. L.
Rxv. 785 (1965).
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The petitioners and others so inclined must come to recognize
that judicial processes are available for the purpose of protecting their
constitutional rights in this district. This does not mean to say that
peaceful, orderly and lawful demonstrations for purposes of dramatizing
grievances or protesting discrimination can ever justify arrests and
prosecutions; however, demonstrations and protests in a disorderly and
unpeaceful and unlawful manner are not sanctioned by the law as this
Court understands it. There is a place in our system for citizens, both
Negro and white, who wish to protest civil wrongs or present grievances
against violations of their rights, to do so, provided they act in a
peaceful and orderly manner and provided they resort to the courts and
not to the streets when they are thwarted in the exercise of this privilege by authorities acting under color of law.
It would be difficult, if not impossible, to forecast the legal guidelines
that will ultimately control decisions on "direct action" civil disobedience.
However, it is interesting to note the "trend" of the Supreme Court. In the
first notable "direct action" case, Garner v. Louisiana,17 the Supreme Court
unanimously reversed the convictions of students who staged sit-ins; however,
in Bell v. Maryland, 8 the Court was divided. This split continued through
Robinson v. Florida's and Griffin v. Maryland.20 By 1965, in Cox v. Louisiana,2' the Court was divided 5-4 for reversal of Cox's conviction for picketing
a courthouse. This 5-4 division of the Court was emphasized in Brown v.
Louisiana,22 and finally in Adderley v. Florida,23 a similarly divided Court
affirmed the conviction of Florida A. & M. University students for demonstrating at a Tallahassee jailhouse to protest the arrest of other students
who had attempted to desegregate public theaters.
It should be kept in mind that disobedience of the law and evasion of the
law are two different things. Civil disobedience is open violation of the
law in support of principles of conscience, accompanied by a willingness to
accept the punishment for such violation. The law evader tries to conceal his
violation. The traffic violator who tries not to get caught is an evader and
not a civil disobedient. Thoreau, a true civil disobedient, announced to all
the world his refusal to pay what he considered an illegal and unjust tax
and willingly went to jail for his refusal.
When is it justified, then, for the citizen acting as his own legislator and
judge to decide he will or will not obey a given law? An answer covering all
the issues this question raises cannot be given here. Nor can a set of principles
be proposed from which anyone can make automatic and infallible judgments
on the legal or moral validity of a specific act of civil disobedience.24

Such

17. 368 U.S. 157 (1961). There were earlier cases: Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454
(1960) (refusal of service to Negroes in an interstate bus terminal); Wolfe v. North Carolina,
364 U.S. 177 (1960) (trespass on a golf course).
18. 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
19. 378 U.S. 153 (1964).
20. 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
21. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
22. 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
23. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
24. For an interesting discussion of this phase of the problem, see Black, The Problem
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judgments require detailed knowledge of the fact situations, often unavailable
to the ordinary citizen. Nevertheless, it is possible to indicate some of the
principal issues raised by modern civil disobedience, some of the more common mistakes made in considering these issues, and one approach that might
be taken toward such issues today.
Initially we should reject - at least in part- two extreme positions. One
is the view that civil disobedience is incompatible with American institutions
of government, and that obedience to law is an invariable obligation, untill
the law is changed by constitutional procedures. This has been referred to
as the "hard-shelled" lawyer's view. The other extreme position is that only
"just" laws need be obeyed, meaning simply that a law carries no obligation
of obedience if the individual thinks it unjust. To accept the latter position
without regard to specific circumstances would lead to destruction of our
legal order.
It is possible, however, to take a much more moderate and plausible
position, and many quite reasonable people do. They conceive that disobedience to the law sometimes can be warranted and, under extreme circumstances, even necessary. Examples of such laws are city ordinances and
state laws that continue, in the face of settled law of the land, to separate
races in the use of public facilities; or an edict by the Selective Service Director to the effect that when a student protests-even in a legal manneragainst the Viet Nam war, he will be punished by revocation of his student
deferment; or laws of the State of California that prohibit reputable physicians from performing abortions when considered medically necessary by an
official board of doctors.
Most people will agree that there is a stronger case for total obedience to
the law, including bad law, in a democracy than in a dictatorship. The
people who must abide by the law in a democracy have presumably been
consulted, and have legal channels through which to express their protests
and to work for reform. One way to define democracy is as a system designed
to provide alternatives to civil disobedience. Some argue that the basic fallacy in this proposition is that it confuses the ideals or aims of democracy
with its inevitably less than perfect accomplishments, and that the power
to work for elimination of injustice within the framework of the law may be
illusory.
It would be a mistake to conclude here that civil disobedience is justified
provided only that it is disobedience in the name of high principles. Strong
moral conviction is not all that is required to turn breaking the law into a
service that benefits society. Civil disobedience is not as simple as other acts
in which men stand up courageously for their principles. It involves violation
of the law, and the law can make no provision for its violation except to
hold the offender liable for punishment. This is the reason President Kennedy
was in such a delicate position at the time of the Negro demonstrations in
Birmingham. He gave many signs that he was personally in sympathy with
the goals of the demonstrators. As a political realist, he probably knew that
of the Compatibility of Civil Disobedience With American Institutions of Government, 43
TEXAS

L. Rxv. 492 (1964).
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these goals could not be attained without dramatic actions crossing the line
of legality, but as Chief Executive he could not give permission or approval
to such actions.
In conclusion, while some may admire men like Gandhi and Thoreau and
King, the right to break the law cannot be officially recognized. No society,
free or tyrannical, can give its citizens the right to break its law; to ask it to
do so is to ask it to proclaim, as a matter of law, that its laws are not laws.
If anybody ever has a "right" to break the law, the right must be moral,
not legal. It is not an unlimited right to disobey any laws that one may
regard as unjust. If it is to be recognized as a "right," it necessarily must
have important and significant restrictions.
First of all, its exercise is subject to standards of just and fair behavior.
One may be correct, for example, in thinking that an ordinance against jaywalking is an unnecessary infringement of an individual right. The conclusion, however, does not make it reasonable for that individual to organize
a sit-down or lie-in in the streets, and hold up traffic during a peak workperiod. Conformity to the concept of justice requires that there be some proportion between the importance of the end sought and the power of the
means employed to obtain it. I recently declared this concept legally sound
25
and applicable in appropriate civil disobedience cases:
There must be in cases like the one now presented, a "constitutional
boundary line" drawn between the competing interests of society.
This Court has the duty and responsibility in this case of drawing the
"constitutional boundary line." In doing so, it seems basic to our constitutional principles that the extent of the right to assemble, demonstrate and march peaceably along the highways and streets in an
orderly manner should be commensurate with the enormity of the
wrongs that are being protested and petitioned against. In this case
the wrongs are enormous. The extent of the right to demonstrate
against these wrongs should be determined accordingly.
This principle constitutes a very significant restriction. Although violence may
be no part of the intention of those who practice civil disobedience, the risks
of violence are present and are part of what must be taken into account when
a program of civil disobedience is contemplated. In short, civil disobedience
is a grave enterprise. It may sometimes be morally or socially justified, but
the provocation for it must be extreme. Basic principles have to be at issue.
The evils being combatted have to be serious ones likely to endure unless
so fought.
Nor is this the only limitation on the individual's moral right to disobey
the law. A more important limitation is that his cause must be just. For
instance, it is argued that if absolutely necessary and if the consequences have
been properly weighed, then it is right to break the law to eliminate racial
inequalities or to dramatize opposition to the Viet Nam conflict; but it
can never be necessary - and no weighing of consequences can ever make it
25. Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965). See also Marshall, The Protest Movement and the Law, 51 VA. L. RF.v. 785 (1965).
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right - to break the law in the name of Nazi principles. In short, the goals
of those who disobey the law must lie at the very heart of what we regard as
morality before we can say they have a moral right to do so.
But who is to make the decisions? Who is to say that one man's moral
principles are right and another's are wrong? The man who breaks a law
he considers immoral asks the rest of us to trust him in preference to
established social conventions and authorities. He has taken a large and
visible chance and implicitly asks us to join him in relying on the probity
of his personal moral judgment.
Thomas Hobbes once remarked that a man may be convinced that God
has commanded him to act as he has, but that God, after all, does not command other men to the same belief. The man who chooses to disobey the law
on principle may be a saint, but he may also be a madman. He may be
a courageous leader, but he also may be merely a political or social demagogue. Whatever he is, his very existence tends to make us painfully aware
that we too are implicitly making choices and must bear responsibility for
them.
Stimulating this awareness indeed may be the most important function
of those who practice civil disobedience. They remind us that the man
who obeys the law has as much of an obligation to look into the morality
and rationality of his conduct as does the man who breaks the law. But
the man who puts his conscience above the law, right or wrong, does take
personal moral responsibility for the social arrangements under which he
lives. And so he dramatizes the fascinating fact that those who obey the
law might do the same. One may obey the law and unfailingly support what
exists, not out of habit or fear, but because he has freely chosen to do so
and is prepared to live with his conscience having made that choice.
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